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The application of a biometric identification technique
for linking community and hospital data in rural Ghana
Eliezer Ofori Odei-Lartey*, Dennis Boateng, Samuel Danso,
Anthony Kwarteng, Livesy Abokyi, Seeba Amenga-Etego,
Stephaney Gyaase, Kwaku Poku Asante and Seth Owusu-Agyei
Kintampo Health Research Centre, Kintampo, Ghana
Background: The reliability of counts for estimating population dynamics and disease burdens in communities
depends on the availability of a common unique identifier for matching general population data with health
facility data. Biometric data has been explored as a feasible common identifier between the health data and
sociocultural data of resident members in rural communities within the Kintampo Health and Demographic
Surveillance System located in the central part of Ghana.
Objective: Our goal was to assess the feasibility of using fingerprint identification to link community data and
hospital data in a rural African setting.
Design: A combination of biometrics and other personal identification techniques were used to identify
individual’s resident within a surveillance population seeking care in two district hospitals. Visits from resident
individuals were successfully recorded and categorized by the success of the techniques applied during
identification. The successes of visits that involved identification by fingerprint were further examined by age.
Results: A total of 27,662 hospital visits were linked to resident individuals. Over 85% of those visits were
successfully identified using at least one identification method. Over 65% were successfully identified and
linked using their fingerprints. Supervisory support from the hospital administration was critical in integrating
this identification system into its routine activities. No concerns were expressed by community members about
the fingerprint registration and identification processes.
Conclusions: Fingerprint identification should be combined with other methods to be feasible in identify-
ing community members in African rural settings. This can be enhanced in communities with some basic
Demographic Surveillance System or census information.
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Introduction
In public health, there is increasing interest in the avail-
ability of reliable data from general community that can
be linked with health facility information (1). Integrating
community and health facility data promises reliable
counts that can be generated as numerators and denomi-
nators of the population and used in generating outputs
for health planning and policy formulation such as
disease burdens, spread of diseases, and health service
coverage (2). The success of this data linkage is deter-
mined by the accuracy of identifying individuals and
matching their basic demographic information with
their data at health facilities where they seek care (3).
A method for correctly identifying individuals must also
ensure that the privacy of that individual’s data is
preserved (4).
In the developing world, the main challenge in match-
ing population-level and health facility data is the lack
of reliable and shared identification methods (5, 6). The
combination of biographic data and national identi-
fication numbers from health insurance cards, passports,
and birth certificates is predominantly used to identify
patients (7).
Health institutions in Ghana combine the use of
national health insurance scheme (NHIS) numbers with
biographic data and locally generated hospital IDs
to identify those who seek care at the health facility (8).
However, one common challenge is that patients who
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attend health facilities fail to present consistent identifi-
cation, either because they have misplaced what they
possess or forgot to carry their identification cards with
them to seek care (5). Furthermore, most hospitals in
poor resource settings operate with paper-based systems,
making it commonplace to find one identification asso-
ciated with multiple people (9). These challenges result
in patient-diagnosis mismatch, duplication of patient
records, and incomplete reporting, which potentially
compromises the reliability of data for decision-making
(10, 11). Moreover, multiple forms of identification using
personally identifiable information tend to compromise
data security in information systems, which can increase
the risk of identity theft (12).
This manuscript reports experiences of using biometric
identification techniques in a routine health information
process at the Kintampo North Municipal Hospital and
Kintampo South District Hospital (KSDH) in the central
part of Ghana. The experiences reported here are
ancillary to the data linkage project initiated as part of
the INDEPTH Network Effectiveness and Safety Studies
(INESS), which provided a platform for researchers in
Africa to conduct Phase IV trials on a large scale (13, 14).
Biometric identification
Biometric identification is a method of recognizing an in-
dividual, using a physical or behavioral characteristic (15).
Common among such include systems for fingerprint
identification, face recognition, iris scan, retina scan,
hand geometry, and voice scan (16, 17). The use of bio-
metric technology has been successful in the fields of
access control, attendance monitoring, and securing
health data, resulting in the rapid advancement of this
and related technologies (1825). Compared to other
biometric identification systems, fingerprint identifica-
tion has a very large vendor base, with different templates
and algorithms (26, 27). This potentially makes finger-
print technology relatively affordable for resource-poor
settings.
Fingerprint identification is based on the notion that
patterns on the frictional fingertips of an individual are
infallible proof of identity (2830) and that these patterns
remain unchanged throughout life. Patterns on the sole
of the foot can also serve as identity (31). A sensor is used
to capture or detect a fingerprint. Software programs
commonly use either minutiae-based matching or pattern
matching for identification (32, 33).
Methods
Study setting
The study was conducted in the Kintampo North and
South Districts, which are located within the forest
savannah transitional ecological zone (34). The Kintampo
Health Research Centre operates a health and demo-
graphic surveillance system, which routinely collects long-
itudinal demographic data such as pregnancies, births,
deaths, migrations, and determinants of health (including
household characteristics, socioeconomic conditions, and
education) of a well-defined population with each indivi-
dual identified by a unique number (35). The Kintampo
Health and Demographic Surveillance System (KHDSS)
has a population of 140,000. There are 12 health centers
and 30 community-based health planning services that
provide health services to the people. Two district hospi-
tals serve as patient referral points within the study area
and approximately 50% (66,508) of the resident popula-
tion are within the catchment area of the two hospitals.
Study procedure
A mass field enrollment exercise was undertaken from
January 2010 to June 2011. This exercise was to expand
data the electronic database (EDB) of the KHDSS to
include the biometric (fingerprint) data and photographs
of all resident members. Resident members in the
KHDSS communities were notified and comprehensively
educated about the enrollment exercise. Approaches to
education and awareness included radio announcements,
the use of announcement vans to communicate in local
dialects, and the use of religious and information centers.
During enrollment, all 10 fingerprints and a photo of
each resident member were entered into the database.
For infants 2 years and below, heel prints were acquired
instead and their photos were taken as a motherchild
pair. All enrolled members received identification cards.
Recruitment of field team
Twenty community members with post-high school qua-
lification and basic computer skills were trained to acquire
the fingerprints and photos of the residence members and
to enter them into a specially designed database appli-
cation. The communities were divided into 10 zones.
Ten field teams were formed, with two members in each
team. Each team was given a complete set of the tools
needed for the exercise, which included field notebooks
and a problem sheet to record exceptional incidences and
problems that occurred during the enrollment exercise.
Raincoats were also provided to protect the delicate
equipment from unexpected rains during the enrollment
exercises. After the mass enrollment exercise, two teams
were maintained to conduct periodic updates on indivi-
duals who newly joined the surveillance system. A data
manager was assigned the task of updating the EDB of
the KHDSS with the data collected from the field on
daily basis.
Health facility system setup
Following the mass enrollment, a desktop computer
was set up at each of the out-patient department (OPD)
units of the two district hospitals, Kintampo North
Municipal Hospital and the KSDH. Each computer
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was equipped with a fingerprint device and a handheld
barcode reader. The upgraded KHDSS EDB used to
enroll resident members was installed on the computers
at the OPD with the purpose of identifying and retrieving
the records (FOLDER) of resident members who visited
the hospitals. Hospital staff at the OPD were trained to
use the fingerprints and other techniques to identify
members that attended the hospital for care.
Identification process at the hospital
Only individuals who visited the OPD during routine
working days (Monday to Friday) between 08:00 and
17:00 Greenwich Mean Time were processed with the
EDB. During this period, the EDB was used to record
the date of visit for each individual that was identified.
The EDB was also designed to record data from non-
resident members who attended the hospitals. The resi-
dence status of individuals was confirmed by residence
information on the EDB. The order of identification for
the methods employed is shown in Fig. 1. The first is
by fingerprint, which is then followed by using a combi-
nation of personally identifiable details such as name,
address, age, and community of residence. Those who
were not identified by fingerprint but were identified by
other methods were recorded as false negative for finger-
print identification. True and false positives were con-
firmed by membership details retrieved, which included
the field-based photographs taken during the enrollment
exercise. A confirmed match of the details was considered
a true positive and if the wrong details were retrieved it
was considered a false positive.
To minimize the impact of disruption in the existing
hospital process, which may result in delays and long
queues, the hospital staff advised that resident patients
who were not part of the enrollment exercise be excluded
from the current study. However, a separate process was
set up to enroll these patients and their basic details
including NHIS ID (if available), fingerprints and photos
were subsequently updated as shown in Fig. 1.
Mobilization of equipment and software setup
Ten mini-laptops were used for the enrollment exercise;
each laptop was equipped with peripheral devices (Figs. 2
and 3) to facilitate fingerprint registration for the entire
The patient’s details was searched
in the following order:
1. Fingerprint Identification
2. Personally Identifiable Information
Start Application
Verify patient’s enrolment
enrolled not enrolled
Search by Fingerprint Enroll Patient
not identified
not identified
Use card-based search
Update fingerprint data
Retrieve patient’s folder for routine healthcare
identified
identified
Search by Personally Identifiable Information
Outcomes for patients
whose details were
searched by fingerprint
and personal data
were recorded
The verification was to find out
if s/he has was part of the
mass enrollment excercise
Data collected during
enrollment are:
1. Basic details
2. Fingerprint data
3. Passport-size photo
Fig. 1. Activity diagram for the identification process. The solid circle at the top of the flow diagram indicates the start of the
process. The colored rectangles with curved edges indicate the major steps in the activity. The diamond shapes in the flow
diagram represent points of decision in the activity; the arrows show the sequence and directions of the activity. The plain
(white) rectangles provide more explanation for some of the processes. These plain rectangles are linked to the processes they
explain by dotted lines; the solid circle with a white ring around it indicates the end of the activity.
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residence population. In addition, a license key was pur-
chased to activate the fingerprint scanning device of each
computer and a server was purchased to store backups.
One box of tools and other accessories were procured for
the maintenance and repair of the computers.
As shown in Fig. 2, Acer Aspire One 2007 (California,
USA) mini-laptops were used. They had a memory size
of 1 gigabyte (GB) and a hard disk capacity of 160 GB.
Logitech HD Webcam C310 2010 (California, USA)
devices were used, as well as the 2008 version of the
Hamster plus IV fingerprint device, developed by SecuGen
Corporation (California, USA). In addition, a USB (uni-
versal serial bus) mouse was attached to each laptop to
improve speed in navigation.
The biometric software for the health facilities was
developed with the Java Development Kit version 1.5
(Oracle Corporation, 2010; California, USA). The MySQL
Database Community Edition 5 (Oracle Corporation,
2010) was used to design the database for the application.
In addition, the Griaule Fingerprint SDK 2009 (California,
USA) library was used to connect the software to the
fingerprint device. The fingerprint library had a threshold
of 45 and a rotation tolerance of 180 (36). Figure 3 shows
how the software and hardware systems were set up for
patient identification at the health facility.
Results and discussions
The average time it took a team to confirm residence
status and enroll an individual was 30 min. An average of
26 enrollments were done per team per day. Factors such
as sudden computer hardware or software malfunctions
and requests for further clarifications prolonged the time
spent on enrolling some individuals. The mass enroll-
ment covered 83.4% (117,403/140,000) of the resident
members. However 100% coverage was achieved at the
catchment area of the two district hospitals. The catch-
ment areas are defined by district health directorates.
These definitions are based on several factors including
population threshold and administrative and political
reasons. None of the resident members refused to enroll
their fingerprints and photographs. This may be due to
the comprehensive education program that was devel-
oped and implemented by a dedicated team prior to and
during the enrollment.
At both hospitals, 43,917 visits were registered in the
EDB during the 12-month period. Of this number, 27,662
visits (63%) were linked to resident members. It is worth
noting that by virtue of their location along a major
highway linking the north and south of Ghana, a large
number of non-resident members attend these district
hospitals for care. A total of 10,214 out of the 27,662
visits were members identified by ID card (either hospital
or NHIS), who were therefore excluded from our analysis.
Our analysis is thus based on 17,448 of the 27,662 visits.
During the identification process at the hospitals, no
refusals were recorded in the use of fingerprints to iden-
tify the patients that attended the health facilities. It took
approximately 7 min for the staff to record biographic
data, fingerprints, and a passport-size photograph from a
patient whose data had not been recorded during the
mass enrollment exercise. However, fingerprint identifi-
cation of an enrolled patient took 30 sec on average. It
is also worth noting that in addition to the 16,255 non-
residents enrolled, 438 of the visits were by members who
were non-resident prior to the mass enrollment exercise
and therefore not enrolled.
As shown in Table 1, out of the 17,448 visits from
resident members, the fingerprint method successfully
identified and linked 11,465 but was unable to identify
5,983. This translates to a sensitivity of 65.7 and 100%
specificity, as demonstrated in Table 2. Fingerprint identi-
fication was further analyzed among three age groups
of resident members (Fig. 4). Results from both health
facilities indicated that the fingerprint identification tech-
nique achieved an average of 68.7% success in accurately
identifying individuals aged 13 and above. An average
1
2 3 4
5 6
78
Fig. 2. Computer hardware and logistics: (1) the raincoats;
(2) the mouse; (3) the biometric fingerprint devices; (4) the
web cameras; (5) the mini-laptops; (6) the red calico used for
the background of the photos taken; (7) the spare batteries
for the mini-laptops; and (8) the field notebooks used.
USB cable USB cableU
SB
 c
ab
le
Fig. 3. Setup for the computers, with peripheral devices. This
setup is typical of computers at the health facilities. Each of
the peripheral devices was connected to the computer system’s
unit via a USB cable. The device to the extreme right of the
diagram is the fingerprint detector. Next to the fingerprint
detector is a barcode reader for scanning identification cards
with barcodes. The last device (black) is a web camera.
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of 57.3% was achieved among children from ages 2 to
12 years while a 35.2% average success rate was achieved
among infants less than 2 years old. The residents of the
area are mainly engaged in farming and manual work (34),
which may have caused poor quality fingerprints (37, 38).
This factor may explain the relatively low success rate
for fingerprint identification among adults. Very low
rates were also realized in identifying the fingerprints
of the very young in the population; those between ages
0 and 12 years posed the main challenge. This confirms
what is known in the literature, suggestive of the fact
that the fingerprints of children in this age group are
still developing, thus making it inconsistent for use in
identification (39).
Further linkage was done based on the personal iden-
tifiers described above on the 5,983 for which fingerprint
identification failed. As shown in Table 1, 3,440 of these
visits were ultimately successfully identified, whereas
2,450 of the visits were unsuccessfully identified. Addi-
tionally, 93 visits resulted in identification of the wrong
person. These data result in a sensitivity of 57.6% and
specificity of 82.7% as shown in Table 2. There were
issues surrounding the use of the personal information
based search method, which resulted in the low success
rate. Due to the relatively low educational levels among
residents (34), members provided inconsistent name
spellings and were less able to remember details like their
age and date of birth as compared to their communities
of residence. In other situations, members had migrated
away from the communities where they were enrolled.
These issues affected the precision of the information-
based search.
The combined effect of using both fingerprints
and personal information to identify patients resulted
in successfully linking 14,905 of the total visits under
consideration. This effort achieved a sensitivity of 85.3%
and a specificity of 82.5% (Table 2). This finding suggests
Table 1. The confusion matrix of the fingerprint, and other
identification tests
Enrollment condition
Identification test results Enrolled Not enrolled
Fingerprint
Identified 11,465 0
Not identified 5,983 438
Other personal information
Identified 3,440 93
Not identified 2,450 438
Fingerprintother personal information
Identified 14,905 93
Not identified 8,433 438
Fig. 4. Age grouping for visits successfully identified by fingerprint for the year 2012. The x-axis categorizes the number of
successful identifications by month. The values on the y-axis are percentage rates over the total number of visits searched by
fingerprints for the given month. The bar graphs indicate the percentage of patient visits from three age groupings for which
fingerprint identification was successful. The blue bar graphs represent age groupings from 13 years and above, the red bars
represent age groupings from 2 years to 12 years, and the green bars represent age groupings of children under 2 years.
Table 2. Sensitivity and specificity of fingerprint and other
identification test
Test Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%) Precision (%)
Fingerprint
identification
65.7 100.0 100.0
Other personal
identification
57.6 82.5 97.4
Fingerprintother
identification
85.3 82.5 99.4
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that biometric identification can be a useful supportive
mechanism to mitigate the limitations associated with
other methods of identification. Our findings further
suggest that adding photo verification to other personal
details is a very advantageous technique in confirming the
true identity of individuals.
Conclusions
This study has demonstrated that it is feasible to use
biometrics to support other methods of patient identifi-
cation in linking health facility data to population data
in predominantly rural communities where a health and
demographic surveillance system exists. However, such an
undertaking is accompanied by several challenges, in-
cluding comprehensive education strategies, high capital
investments in technology and maintenance, and very
poor fingerprint sensitivity due to occupational and other
socio-demographic characteristics. Though the biometric
method has relatively low sensitivity, it will be very useful
as an ancillary to card-based and information-based iden-
tification techniques. Moreover, the applicability of this
system in places without a demographic surveillance sys-
tem needs to be investigated. These factors may require
context-specific approaches when deploying this techni-
que in other settings.
Due to resource constraints, the study was conducted
at 2 out of 36 health facilities within the Kintampo
surveillance site. Similar studies should consider a wider
coverage of health facilities to provide more representa-
tive results of an entire residence population.
Further work is also needed to assess the extent to
which fingerprint identification reduces challenges asso-
ciated with patient-diagnosis mismatching, as well as
issues of duplicated and fragmented patient data. Further
studies should also examine other essential determinants
of adopting biometrics in low-resource settings, which
may include the ease of using the fingerprint devices in
routine healthcare processes, how effective biometric iden-
tification is during emergency cases, as well the capability
and willingness of available information technology (IT)
support staff to maintain such systems.
On a production scale, data linkage with biometrics in
resource-limited settings may consider the adoption of
low-power technologies with energy harvesting capabi-
lities to minimize the effects of frequent power outages on
its implementation (40).
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